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STAKEHOLDER THEORY, VALUE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE

ABSTRACT
This paper argues that the notion of value has been overly simplified and narrowed to
focus on economic returns. Stakeholder theory provides an appropriate lens for considering a
more complex perspective of the value that stakeholders seek as well as new ways to measure it.
We develop a four-factor perspective for defining value that includes, but extends beyond, the
economic value stakeholders seek. To highlight its distinctiveness, we compare this perspective
to three other popular performance perspectives. Recommendations are made regarding
performance measurement for both academic researchers and practitioners. The stakeholder
perspective on value offered in this paper draws attention to those factors that are most closely
associated with building more value for stakeholders, and in so doing, allows academics to better
measure it and enhances managerial ability to create it.

Keywords: value, performance measurement, corporate performance, stakeholder theory,
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Stakeholder theory has infiltrated the academic dialogue in management and a wide array
of disciplines such as health care, law, and public policy (Freeman, et al. 2010). Much attention
has been paid to some basic themes that are now familiar in the literature – that firms have
stakeholders and should proactively pay attention to them (i.e., Freeman, 1984), that stakeholder
theory exists in tension (at least) with shareholder theory (i.e., Friedman, 1970), that stakeholder
theory provides a vehicle for connecting ethics and strategy (i.e., Phillips, 2003), and that firms
that diligently seek to serve the interests of a broad group of stakeholders will create more value
over time (i.e., Campbell, 1997; Freeman, 1984; Freeman, Harrison & Wicks, 2009).
Nevertheless, there are so many different interpretations of basic stakeholder ideas that theory
development has been difficult (Scherer & Patzer, 2011).
In spite of its importance to stakeholder theory, little attention has been devoted to
questions regarding what it means to create value for stakeholders and how we can measure it.
Part of the reason for the relative absence of discussion may be that researchers assume they
know what value means. For example, much heat and debate in the stakeholder literature regards
the issue of who has legitimacy and to whom managers have responsibilities (e.g. Donaldson &
Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1994; Goodpaster & O’Halloran, 1994; Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997).
At their core, these studies are about who should have claim to the spoils of the firm. For
instance, legitimate stakeholders presumably should get a larger share. An inherent assumption
in this literature is that the concept of value is already understood as economic value (i.e., Agle,
Mitchell & Sonnenfeld, 1999). If the only relevant value created by a firm is economic then the
legitimacy arguments may actually feed animosity among stakeholders – that they are all vying
for a piece of the economic pie, and each wants a larger share. This type of animosity is contrary
to the underlying philosophy that has characterized stakeholder theory emphasizing the “joint-
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ness” of stakeholder interests and the need for all stakeholders to benefit over time through their
cooperation (Freeman, 1984; Freeman, Harrison & Wicks, 2009).
Another major stream of literature addresses the size-of-pie issue by attempting to link
good (i.e., generous, fair) stakeholder treatment with the creation of value (i.e., Berman, Wicks,
Kotha & Jones, 1999; Choi & Wang, 2009; Hillman & Keim, 2001; Preston & Sapienza, 1990).
The underlying assumption of most studies of this type is that economic measures capture the
value created through good treatment of stakeholders, thus sidestepping the notion that much of
the value stakeholders get from working with stakeholder-friendly firms may not be captured in
economic measures. While economic returns are fundamental to a firm’s core stakeholders, most
stakeholders want other things as well (Bosse, Phillips & Harrison, 2009). Attention to these
other factors may prove critical to understanding why firms succeed over time, why stakeholders
are drawn to (and remain with) some firms, and which firms do the most for their stakeholders.
These two important streams in the stakeholder literature demonstrate the need for a more
thorough evaluation of the concept of value. A stakeholder-based perspective of value is
important from a managerial perspective because managers tend to focus attention on things that
lead to higher performance based on what actually gets measured (Kaplan & Norton, 1992;
Sachs & Rühli, 2011). Rather than focusing primarily on economic measures of performance, a
stakeholder-based performance measure challenges managers to examine more broadly the value
their firms are creating from the perspective of the stakeholders who are involved in creating it.
Thus, it gives managers the information they need to engage stakeholders where they are and
enhance managerial ability to use such insights to create more value. At its core, this perspective
is about creating a higher level of well-being for the stakeholders involved in a system of value
creation led by the firm.
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From an academic researcher’s perspective, most empirical studies based on stakeholder
theory have used a measure of stakeholder performance as the independent variable, with some
measure of economic performance as the dependent variable (i.e., Berman, Wicks, Kotha &
Jones, 1999; Choi & Wang, 2009; Hillman & Keim, 2001). If a broad-based measure of
stakeholder performance instead becomes the dependent variable, with an organizational action
or phenomenon as the independent variable, then there is much greater potential to understand
how that phenomenon is influencing the overall value the firm creates. Further, this perspective
suggests that while recommendations made by business scholars on how managers can create
economic value may have merit, they could also lead managers to take actions that create
economic value while reducing other types of stakeholder value. This, in turn, not only
diminishes the value of the insights, it also raises questions about the ability of the firm to sustain
its economic performance over time – especially if efforts to focus on financial returns ignore or
erode bases of support from some of the firm’s stakeholders.
In this paper we begin by discussing the concept of value, noting some of the ways it has
been understood and using this understanding as a platform to argue for why we need a more
complex view that is grounded in stakeholders. We then develop a 4-factor model of stakeholder
value and turn to operationalizing it using the existing literature on happiness as one way of
demonstrating the practicality of our model. We conclude by noting implications and directions
for future research.
ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING VALUE
Revisiting some foundational texts and thinkers in economics provides useful insights for
this project. Adam Smith (1776) provides at least two important perspectives on “value”. First, a
central premise of The Wealth of Nations is that individuals know what is best for them – that
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value is something that individuals should define for themselves and not allow governments or
others to choose in their stead (Smith, 1776). Although Milton Friedman (1970) is often
criticized as providing an amoral vision of business, a careful reading of his work also highlights
the importance of moral ideals, particularly individual freedom – to decide how to live, where to
work, what to buy (i.e. what is of “value”) and under what terms (i.e. what “value” they are
willing to pay to receive the value they seek). The push to emphasize individual freedom and
reject allowing others (e.g. government, one’s peers) to make choices for oneself is precisely the
impetus that drives our inquiry – that individual differences in defining value are fundamental.
Second, Smith (1776) emphasizes that healthy markets allow customers to choose – what
they will buy, from whom (i.e. among a number of potential vendors for any given item), and
under what terms. Such a market also operates for other stakeholder roles, including for
employment (e.g. for whom will I work, under what terms, for what compensation). We know
from the basics of markets that people will tend to make choices that provide them the most
value for what value they give up. When they can find a better deal – i.e. more value for what
they give up for it – people will tend to shift from their previous choice to this better deal over
time. As such, if firms want to be successful, they need to find ways to improve what they do to
better appeal to their customers.
If we shift to other thinkers who were key in the evolution of economic thought and
current understandings of “value”, two figures stand out: Jeremy Bentham (1789) and J.S. Mill
(1863). Jeremy Bentham, widely credited as the “father” of utilitarianism, began the focus on
value as measured by specific aggregate measurements of pleasure and pain. For him morality
and good public policy were best understood in terms of decisions that maximized pleasure and
minimized pain – irrespective of whether such choices went against tradition, authority, or rule-
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based notions of morality (e.g. Kant). In Bentham’s view pleasure and pain were sensory-based
phenomena that could be measured and systematized across all persons (Bentham, 1789). Other
than attending to factors like duration and intensity that related to the total utility of an
experience, Bentham viewed all pleasures and pain of equal standing (i.e. no qualitative
differences).
While utility remained the core foundation for morality (and what should drive public
policy), Mill (1863) believed there were critical differences across types of pleasure and pain,
suggesting qualitative differences that had to be taken into account in any approach to defining
or measuring utility. Mill was particularly enamored with the life of the mind and the higher
pleasures it offered. Such innovations complicated the notion of “value” within utility,
suggesting that value was more than simple pain and pleasure. Mill’s shift in focus in thinking
about utility is captured in the language of the “greatest happiness” principle. That is, utility is
not simply a collection of raw sensory experiences, but a way of understanding how certain
experiences enabled one to live a better life. Mill’s innovation, forcing scholars to appreciate the
qualitative differences in utility, has had wide influence (e.g. Sidgwick , 1981: 441, defines
utility as “happiness”; Shaw, 1999, defines utility as “well-being”), including the emergent
research on “happiness” in management (e.g. Haidt, 2006; Judge and Kammeyer-Mueller, 2011).
Later in this paper we will return to the concept of happiness as a potentially useful way to think
about measuring how stakeholders feel about the value they receive through their interactions
with a firm.
Modern economic thought emerged from this intellectual backdrop, particularly as it
relates to utility and the measurement of outcomes. Questions about utility and its relevance for
modern economics have been explored in a wide array of literatures, particularly under the
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headings of “welfare economics” and “social choice theory”, and relevant research has been
developed by philosophers, economists, political scientists, game theorists, and others
(Hausmann & McPherson, 2006; Sen, 1987). Value has been tied to a variety of factors: value as
determined by price; value as determined by labor; value as determined by exchange; and value
as determined by production (see Table 1). Sen (1987; 1998) argues for an array of factors,
beyond aggregate utility, as important dimensions of value to both the individual and society,
such as the creation of capabilities essential to development and living a good or happy life. 1
(Insert Table 1 about here)
Our position in this paper is consistent with many scholars who have criticized the trend
in economic thought, influential in an array of literatures (including management), that has
brought a narrowing in conceptions of value (Hausman & McPherson, 2006: 133; Satz, 2010: 60;
Sen, 1998). While simplification of the construct of value enables certain research capabilities
(e.g. complex mathematical modeling), it also tends to obscure other critical aspects of utility
relevant to a discussion of value – particularly dimensions that extend beyond profitability and
economic returns. This paper draws upon some of the theory already crafted on utility and value
while using a stakeholder perspective to address a context and set of concerns that have not been
highlighted in existing research on value. For the purposes of this paper, we will define “value”
broadly as anything that has the potential to be of worth to stakeholders. The term “utility” will
be understood to reflect value a stakeholder receives that actually has merit in the eyes of the
stakeholder – it is a function of the stakeholder’s utility function, which expresses the
stakeholder’s preferences for particular types of value.

1

There are also contributors within economics and political theory who have argued for objective constraints or
limitations on pursuits of utility maximization, whether by individuals or across society, based on normative
principles. For example, Rawls (1971) and Nozick (1974) both argue for the critical and fundamental role of
individual freedoms that limit efforts to maximize utility.
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STAKEHOLDER THEORY AND VALUE CREATION
Smith’s (1776) argument that healthy markets allow individuals to choose is similar to
Freeman’s (1984) perspective that all stakeholders are “customers” – they all have decisions to
make in terms of whether the utility a firm provides them is greater than what they give up from
other opportunities. By this logic, firms that tend to make their stakeholders better off will be
ones that are able to retain their support and participation and thrive over time. Stakeholders
themselves determine their own utility functions based on individual preferences, consistent with
Smith (1776) and Friedman (1970). Their preferences come from perceptions regarding how
transactions, relationships and interactions with the firm influence the utility they receive. As
mentioned previously, we will suggest in a later section that one possible way to measure those
perceptions is in terms of the happiness stakeholders feel with regard to the utility they obtain
pertaining to both tangible and intangible factors.
A central premise of much of the literature on stakeholder theory is that focusing on
stakeholders, specifically treating them well and managing for their interests, helps a firm create
value along a number of dimensions and is therefore good for firm performance (e.g. Donaldson
& Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; 1994; Freeman, Harrison and Wicks, 2007; Harrison, et. al.,
2010; Jones, 1995; Jones & Wicks, 1999). The existing empirical literature, reviewed by
Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Parmar and de Colle (2010), is generally supportive of a positive
relationship between stakeholder-oriented management and firm performance, which is almost
always measured in terms of financial returns (i.e., Berman, Wicks, Kotha & Jones, 1999; Choi
& Wang, 2009; Hillman & Keim, 2001). Thus, as we mentioned previously, in most stakeholderoriented empirical studies stakeholder performance is the independent variable rather than the
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dependent variable. Consequently, the empirical stakeholder literature itself reinforces the idea
that financial returns are the most relevant measure of the value created by a firm.
Financial performance is important to many of a firm’s stakeholders, but it is not the only
aspect of value that is important to stakeholders. Consistent with Freeman’s (1984) fundamental
idea that a firm should serve multiple stakeholders, firm performance might be defined as the
total value created by the firm through its activities, which is the sum of the utility created for
each of a firm’s legitimate stakeholders. Phillips (2003) identifies a firm’s legitimate (or
normative) stakeholders as those groups to whom the firm owes an obligation based on their
participation in the cooperative scheme that constitutes the organization and makes it a going
concern. They include customers, communities in which the firm operates, suppliers of capital,
equipment, materials, and labor. Firms may have other legitimate stakeholders specific to their
own situations.
Conflict or Cooperation
Much of the existing business literature posits that the interests of stakeholders are in
conflict. This is understandable. A simple identification of stakeholders and their interests tends
to generate lists that point even the casual observer in different directions as we move from one
group to the next. Particularly if we start with the view that the firm has a fixed pie of resources,
each group will be vying for as many of those resources as they can – and the success of any one
group in getting resources diminishes the amount left for the others. Folding in assumptions from
agency theory about the motivation and disposition of stakeholders, particularly that they are
self-interested and with guile (Williamson, 1985), the picture of deep-seated conflict among
stakeholder interests is vividly drawn. In contrast, one of the underlying arguments, found
repeatedly in the stakeholder literature as well as the inter-firm networks literature, is that firms
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tend to perform better when they see stakeholder interests as joined, or at least largely
overlapping, than firms that see them as primarily conflicting (i.e., Dyer & Singh, 1998;
Freeman, 1984; Freeman, Harrison & Wicks, 2007; Freeman, Wicks & Parmar, 2004).
Fortunately, we know from the experience of real firms that organizations are able to
operate in ways that draw in stakeholders and create enough overlap in their interests for them to
function. Conflicts of interest and tensions among stakeholders still exist, particularly in cases
that highlight those potential tensions (e.g. where the focus is on the allocation of a fixed pie of
resources at a given point in time). However, stakeholder theory highlights the underlying
overlap of stakeholder interests in generating value and describes the operations of a firm as a
mechanism for all stakeholders to become better off over time (Freeman, Harrison & Wicks,
2007). This argument is supported by the idea that stakeholders depend on the firm and its other
stakeholders to satisfy their own interests. Stakeholder interests are inseparably connected in a
system of value creation in which each stakeholder provides resources or influence in exchange
for some combination of tangible and/or intangible goods (Sachs & Rühli, 2011). The quality of
contributions of each stakeholder to the system influences the total value created in the system
(Susniene & Vanagas, 2006).
Part of what holds stakeholder cooperation together and generates utility for stakeholders
is the presence of shared norms that go beyond strict self-interest. Researchers from a variety of
disciplines have demonstrated that most people operate within norms of fairness and
reciprocation (Becker, 1986; Cialdini, 1984; Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Fehr & Gachter,
2000; Rabin, 1998; Rawls, 1971), while other scholars have gone so far as to suggest that love is
a motivating agent in organizations (i.e., Argandoña, 2011) – all of which may provide both
direct and indirect (e.g. enabling behaviors like trust that lead to increased value creation) forms
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of value for stakeholders. The fact that they voluntarily come together to participate as
stakeholders of the firm is powerful evidence that their interests are overlapping and reinforcing
to a substantial degree.
A STAKEHOLDER-BASED PERSPECTIVE ON VALUE
We now present a stakeholder-based perspective on firm performance that is derived
from the value a firm creates through its activities. It is based on the core ideas that all of the
firm’s legitimate stakeholders have customer-like power to engage or not to engage with a firm
and that the utility that is created for one stakeholder is dependent, in part, on the behavior of the
firm’s other stakeholders. Furthermore, stakeholders determine their own utility functions. The
amount of utility they receive from the firm influences whether they choose to engage with the
firm and how they act when engaged in transactions with the firm.
Our perspective focuses on four factors that emerge from a focus on stakeholders and the
value they seek from relations with a firm. The factors incorporate not only the tangible value
stakeholders seek, but also consider the process and distribution of value (Harrison, Bosse &
Phillips, 2010). The four factors are defined in terms of the perceived utility stakeholders receive
from the firm, consistent with the idea that perception influences utility (Barney, 2011). They
are: 1) stakeholder utility associated with actual goods and services, 2) stakeholder utility
associated with organizational justice, 3) stakeholder utility from affiliation, and 4) stakeholder
utility associated with perceived opportunity costs.
These factors were selected among the many that could have been included specifically
because they have been identified in previous research to be important to stakeholders (Ashforth
& Mael, 1989; Bosse, et. al, 2009; Spiller, 2011; Susniene & Vanagas, 2006) and they are broad
enough to incorporate much of what stakeholders seek through their interactions with a firm.
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Consequently, they are closely associated with the motivation of stakeholders to cooperate in the
value creating activities of the firm. That is, each category is important at the individual level,
yet it simultaneously relates to the value that is sought by the group of stakeholders associated
with the firm and therefore helps establish how and why they cooperate successfully over time
(e.g. they seek these particular goods and services; they value the sense of fairness and shared
norms the firm provides; they believe they get the best deal from their association). While there
are a wide array of other specific things one might cite as important to individual stakeholders,
there is a need for parsimony in any model: to offer a model that is both specific enough to
capture core features and broad enough to capture the range of the phenomenon in question.
Physical Goods and Services
Perhaps the most obvious source of utility for stakeholders is found in the physical goods
and services provided by the firm, where physical goods also include financial remuneration in a
variety of forms. Economists have studied exchanges of goods and services for centuries. The
field of marketing also has developed elaborate theories regarding how customers determine the
amount of value they are willing to part with in exchange for something they want. Some of the
value given up includes time and effort, as well as uncertainty regarding the extent to which
whatever is purchased will really provide the expected level of utility. A reasonable goal for the
firm with regard to its customers is to create goods and services that are perceived as providing a
highly positive ratio between the utility received and the value given up (Barney, 2011).
Similar thinking is applicable to all of a firm’s legitimate stakeholders (Freeman, 1984).
Suppliers give up goods and services as well as time and other resources, and are subject also to
transaction uncertainties, in exchange for financial (and other forms of) payment. Financiers
provide capital and face uncertainty as they hope for returns from the firms in which they invest.
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Employees give of their time, efforts, and other resources in exchange for wages and other firmspecific tangible benefits. Communities provide locations and infrastructure and frequently also
provide a large part of the work force in exchange for tangible benefits such as employment of
its citizens, tax revenues, and economic growth (through local purchases). Other stakeholders
may also be included in this list depending on the situation of the firm. As with customers, the
goal for a firm is to create the best value possible as perceived by stakeholders such that the
utility they receive is sufficient to warrant continued, cooperative engagement with the firm.
Organizational Justice
Researchers from a variety of disciplines have demonstrated that most people operate
within norms of fairness and reciprocation (Becker, 1986; Cialdini, 1984; Cropanzano &
Mitchell, 2005; Fehr & Gachter, 2000; Rabin, 1998; Rawls, 1971). The organizational justice
literature examines several types of fairness. Distributional justice means that actors believe that
material outcomes received as a result of transactions with another party are perceived as fair in
comparison with the material outcomes received by other parties (Adams, 1965; Rabin, 1993).
Procedural justice pertains to the fairness of the rules and procedures used to assist in making
decisions that have an impact on another party (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson & Porter, 2001).
Interactional justice describes the ways people treat each other in regular interactions
(Cropanzano, Bowen & Giulliland, 2007). A firm that treats stakeholders respectfully would be
considered interactionally just.
Organizational justice is important to value creation because people reciprocate and they
value being treated fairly (Blau, 1964; Simon, 1966). For instance, a worker who is paid more
than their opportunity cost of staying with a particular employer is likely to reciprocate by
providing more than their minimal effort at work (Akerlof, 1982). From a purely economic
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perspective a firm that pays more than an employee’s opportunity cost is wasting resources. We
acknowledge this, but would argue that the reciprocation argument does not apply only to
financial remuneration. Distributive justice, most closely associated with economic factors, is
supplemented by perceptions of procedural and interactional justice as stakeholders assess how
much utility they are receiving from a firm. For example, a firm might provide a wage and
benefits that satisfy, but do not exceed, employee expectations based on distributive justice.
However, employees might still receive utility from the firm that is worthy of positive
reciprocity due to the way they are treated from the perspectives of both procedural and
interactional justice. Similar logic applies to all of a firm’s stakeholders. The key is to determine
what matters to stakeholders and to provide for them an amount of utility that they perceive as
favorable (Harrison, Bosse & Phillips, 2010). Negative reciprocity can likewise have a negative
impact on human behavior (Bewley, 1998).
Thus far our discussion has focused on dyadic relationships between a firm and each of
its individual stakeholders, and the resulting reciprocity. However, stakeholder theory also
provides a lens for understanding how the way a firm treats one stakeholder can influence
relationships with other stakeholders (Freeman, Harrison & Wicks, 2007; Rowley, 1997). In
other words, the influence of the whole group of stakeholder relationships on the value created is
greater than the sum of the influence of each relationship taken separately. This form of
interdependence is associated with a phenomenon called generalized exchange (Ekeh, 1974).
Generalized exchanged involves multiple actors who are part of an integrated set of
transactions in which reciprocations are indirect in the sense that there is not a one-to-one
correspondence between what actors take from and give to another actor (Ekeh, 1974; Bearman,
1997). Because people have memories, it is even possible for much time to elapse between
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events that are significant to the actors (Wade-Benzoni, 2002). The actors put events in the
context of other events that have happened over time. Generalized exchange explains why
stakeholders are sometimes willing to sacrifice some of the value they receive if they believe it is
in the best interests of other stakeholders or the firm over time. For instance, employees may be
willing to take a pay cut or suppliers may be willing to re-write a contract if they believe it will
be good for the firm’s entire network of stakeholders (Harrison, et. al, 2010). Other examples of
generalized exchange are found in the kinship structures of primitive peoples, barn raisings, or
sharing software on the Internet (Molm, Collett & Shaefer, 2007). Bosse et al. (2009: 449)
explain that “third-party observers of an exchange will systematically reward or punish those
they perceive as fair or unfair, respectively.” Generalized exchange, then, provides a partial
answer to the question of why the whole of stakeholder relationships can be greater than the sum
of its parts. That is, the way a firm treats one stakeholder influences relationships with others.
Trust, understood as a willingness of one party to be vulnerable to another with the
expectation of non-opportunistic behavior, is important to both reciprocity and generalized
exchange and is fostered by the presence of fairness in relationships among parties (Mayer, Davis
and Schoorman, 1995). Assuming bounded rationality (Cyert and March, 1963), a stakeholder is
probably unlikely to exhibit behaviors such as incremental effort, generosity, and loyalty unless
there is some expectation that the firm can be trusted to reciprocate by distributing some of the
additional value created back to the stakeholder. This additional value might come in the form of
more or better tangible goods and services, which may include financial remuneration
(distributional), greater consideration of the needs of the stakeholder in organizational decision
processes (procedural) or simply better treatment during transactions (interactional). Trust is also
important to the transfer of sensitive yet valuable information between stakeholders and the firm
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(Harrison, et al., 2010), which is essential to the rapid and efficient development of new
technology that is a hallmark of value creation in the modern global economy.
Organizational Affiliation
Stakeholders also receive utility from affiliating with organizations that exhibit behaviors
that are consistent with things they value. They identify with the firm. Social identity theory
explains that people tend to classify themselves into social categories associated with organizations
and other types of groups in an effort to understand who they are (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). If the
firm embodies characteristics that are considered valuable by, for example, its employees,
organizational affiliation can provide feelings of connectedness, esteem, and empowerment
(Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Hogg & Turner, 1985). As employees invest energy, effort, time and
attention in the firm they develop feelings of “ownership”, which provides a sense of
responsibility, shared interest, and motivation to work at high levels (Pierce, Rubenfeld, &
Morgan, 1991; Vandewalle, Van Dyne & Kostova, 1995).
Utility through affiliation occurs, in part, through the ability of actors to obtain benefits
from their membership in social networks (Lee, Lee & Pennings, 2001; Nahapiet & Ghoshal,
1998; Portes, 1998). From a stakeholder perspective, group affiliation can motivate stakeholders
to care about one another’s interests and the success of the firm (Hartman, 2011; Putnam, 2000).
In fact, Hartman (2011: 96) suggests a similar notion about affiliation – that it can support
collective action that benefits all stakeholders involved and serves the larger good they seek
through their cooperation. Stakeholder desire for affiliation encourages stakeholders to
contribute to creating more value and discourages them from behavior that destroys it.
Utility through affiliation may also provide esteem and satisfaction. By esteem, we mean
that people feel as though they are supporting an organization whose behavior they see as
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virtuous or desirable. Satisfaction in this context refers to actual feelings of happiness as
stakeholders interact with an organization that exceeds what they might feel when interacting
with some other firm in the same way. For example, a customer may feel happier about buying a
product from a firm simply because their own value system is in some way consistent with the
expressed and actualized values of that firm.
Esteem and satisfaction can work in both positive and negative directions. A stakeholder
can feel bad about identifying with a firm that has engaged in activities that are inconsistent with
their own values, such as damaging the environment or contracting with suppliers who use child
labor in third-world countries. This does not mean that stakeholders will necessarily cease to
conduct business with the offending firm. Our perspective suggests that the utility stakeholders
gain from affiliation with a firm is only one part of the package, which is then combined with the
other factors: tangible utility, justice and fairness, and opportunity cost. For example, a
stakeholder may continue to do business with a firm if the purely economic value of doing so
outweighs the negative effects of affiliation. But it does mean that there is less motivation to do
so than there would be if the firm were perceived by the stakeholder as a virtuous organization.
Opportunity Costs and the Interconnectedness of Factors
Thus far we have defined utility in terms of 1) the tangible benefits created for
stakeholders associated with the products and services of the firm, 2) the intangible benefits
stakeholders enjoy based on just and fair treatment, and 3) the benefits of affiliating with
particular organizations. Embedded within each of these factors is the notion of opportunity costs
(Kerins, Smith & Smith, 2004; Spiller, 2011). As mentioned previously, utility is based on
perception (Barney, 2011), and perception is influenced to a great degree by whether
stakeholders believe they are getting a good deal from the organization compared with what they
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might expect to receive through interactions with other firms that serve similar purposes. For
instance, members of a firm’s community are likely to compare the amount of value they receive
in terms of tax revenues or employment opportunities to other firms in the community of similar
size and scope or even firms in other communities. Suppliers, customers, financiers, and
employees make similar comparisons.
In addition to the interconnectedness of the concept of opportunity costs with the three
other factors, each of those factors overlaps the others to some degree. For example, the way a
firm treats a stakeholder with regard to justice and fairness influences their perceptions of the
virtuousness of the organization (and thus utility from affiliation) and also the way the
stakeholder feels about the tangible goods and services obtained from the relationship. Similarly,
tangible utility from goods and services influences perceptions of justice (especially distributive
justice) as well as utility from affiliation. Of course, utility from affiliation also influences
stakeholder perceptions about the other two factors. What emerges from this discussion is a
picture of a firm at the center of a network of stakeholders whose behavior is influenced, in part,
by the treatment the firm gives to other stakeholders (Susniene & Vanagas, 2006). It is a value
creation cycle, consistent with the systems perspective that what happens at one part of a system
influences other parts of the system directly, and that eventually the influence returns to the
initial part of the system to reinforce the original occurrence.
For example, consider a case in which employees believe that they have received a good
deal in terms of the total value they receive from a firm, compared with their opportunity cost.
Those employees, according to the principle of reciprocity, are likely to give effort and loyalty
above that which would otherwise be the case (Vandewalle, Van Dyne & Kostova, 1995). Their
behavior can result in better products or products that are produced more cheaply, which allows
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the firm to increase its value proposition to customers. As value to the customer increases, so
does demand. Demand leads to growth in sales and profits, which provides more value to
investors and surplus profits that managers can reinvest, with part of that reinvestment going
back to employees as value in the form of higher compensation. An assumption important to this
cycle is that the firm will continue to incorporate distributional justice such that a portion of the
incremental value will be distributed back to employees to reinforce their behavior.
The value creation cycle also supports negative reciprocity. For this example, we will
begin with the customer. Assume that managers, in an effort to spike short term profits to
enhance their own welfare with respect to compensation, reduce the value proposition to
customers either through unjustified price increases or reduction in the quality of the product. In
essence, they are then transferring value from customers to the firm, and ultimately to themselves
(through bonuses or other forms of compensation). Customers recognize the reduced value and
demand drops. Without continuing through the rest of the cycle, it is easy to understand how
eventually the total value created in the system will be reduced. If managers persist in their
behavior they might reduce the value proposition to customers again, resulting in a loss of
customer demand for products, which in turn erodes future prospects for the firm.
COMPARISON OF STAKEHOLDER-BASED WITH OTHER PERSPECTIVES ON
FIRM PERFORMANCE
Thus far in this paper we have examined and adopted concepts from some of the
fundamental economics and stakeholder literatures pertaining to the construct of value. We have
built on this foundation a stakeholder-based perspective of performance defined as the sum of the
utility created by a firm for its legitimate stakeholders. We will now briefly compare this
stakeholder-based performance perspective to three other popular performance measurement
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perspectives, not for the sake of a detailed comparison, but to highlight ways in which our
approach differs from: a shareholder perspective, the Balanced Scorecard and the Triple Bottom
Line.
Shareholder-based Financial Performance
Firm performance for much of the business and economics literature is focused on
providing financial returns, variously referred to as profits, return-on-investment (ROI),
economic rents, or shareholder returns (for a review, see Barney, 2011, chapter 1). Many
scholars believe that shareholders should be the highest priority firm stakeholder (i.e., Berle &
Means, 1932; Rappaport, 1986; Jensen, 2001; Wallace, 2003), in part because shareholders do
not have a specifiable contract with the organization, which makes them residual claimants
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). The logic continues that providing the maximum possible return to
shareholders is the primary duty of firm managers. However, even if one resource provider or
another does have the residual claim, why should a firm be obligated to maximize that residual at
the expense of other resource providers? It might also be argued that stakeholders that provide
more or better resources to a firm than their contracts require are also entitled to some of the
surplus value created (Barney, 2011).
Jensen (2001) argued for a single corporate objective function, “I argue that since it is
logically impossible to maximize in more than one dimension, purposeful behavior requires a
single valued objective function (297).” However, much has happened in the financial markets to
expose well-entrenched economic theories upon which such arguments have been made. The
Nobel laureate economist Paul Krugman (2009) wrote, “As I see it, the economics profession
went astray because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in impressive-looking
mathematics, for truth… Economists will have to learn to live with messiness. That is, they will
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have to acknowledge the importance of irrational and often unpredictable behavior, face up to
the often idiosyncratic imperfections of markets and accept that an elegant economic ‘theory of
everything’ is a long way off”. Similarly, Barney (2011) admits that tackling issues associated
with measuring performance from the perspective of multiple stakeholders is important even if it
makes the process more complex.
From a stakeholder perspective, financial performance metrics are important because
they are important to all of the firm’s core stakeholders, but they are incomplete and
oversimplify the roles of and utility received by the various stakeholders involved in firm success
(Barney, 2011). Financial measures offer an important but limited perspective on value creation,
particularly when they are tied to efforts to quantify events in terms of specific and measurable
financial outcomes in the short or medium term - and thus reduce the ability and/or desire of
managers to think more broadly about what a firm might do to increase total value across
stakeholders. We should remember that what is tracked tends to be what gets managerial
attention in an organization (Kaplan & Norton, 1992; Sachs & Rühli, 2011). Measuring
performance through tangible and intangible factors that are important to core stakeholders, as
proposed herein, allows organizations to better understand what stakeholders want and need –
both as a retrospective measure of how well firms have done and to help form new ideas about
how firms will perform in the future. If the ability to create utility for stakeholders matters, and is
a central predictor of future firm performance, then it is important to find ways of capturing more
complex notions of value in a systematic and comprehensible fashion.
Furthermore, most financial performance measures are so aggregated that they are not
particularly useful in pinpointing problems within the organization (Johnson & Kaplan, 1987). In
contrast, if an organization is using performance metrics that track utility created across multiple
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stakeholders, it is in a much better position to pinpoint potential sources of problems within the
system that are reducing the amount of total value created.
The Balanced Scorecard and Triple Bottom Line
Some progress has been made with regard to measuring (and controlling) performance
across multiple perspectives. The two most prominent examples are the Balanced Scorecard
(Kaplan & Norton, 1992) and the Triple Bottom Line (Elkington, 1999). A multiple-perspective
approach has also been advocated by other authors (i.e., Atkinson, Waterhouse & Wells, 1997;
Cameron, 1980; Chakravarthy, 1986; Connolly, Conlon & Deutsch, 1980); however, we will
focus on the Balanced Scorecard and Triple Bottom Line because they have received
considerable attention and have been influential with practitioners.
The Balanced Scorecard examines firm performance from the perspective of finances,
customers, innovation and learning, and internal efficiency. In advocating for the Scorecard,
Kaplan and Norton (1992) argue: “Senior executives understand that their organization’s
measurement system strongly affects the behavior of managers and employees. Executives also
understand that traditional financial accounting measures like return on investment and earnings
per share can give misleading signals for continuous improvement and innovation… The
traditional financial performance measures worked well for the industrial era, but they are out of
step with the skills and competencies companies are trying to master today (172).”
Some of the arguments made by Kaplan and Norton (1992) apply equally well to a
stakeholder-based performance construct. For instance, they argue that their four performance
areas are connected. This is also an important feature of our stakeholder-based perspective.
Furthermore, their model is multi-stakeholder in that they recommend measuring customer
perceptions directly and employee issues indirectly through their internal efficiency construct.
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However, they leave out some important stakeholders, such as suppliers and communities, who
also supply essential resources. And although the Scorecard measures four areas, the primary
dependent variable is still financial returns (Kaplan and Norton, 1992). The other three areas are
present to facilitate maximizing profits – thus, instead of creating a richer conception of value,
this sort of measure attempts to oversimplify and monetize it, creating the appearance of
measurability and commensurability across categories. In essence, this perspective on value
simply adds additional factors to consider and measure while retaining the conception of value
provided by the shareholder view.
The Triple Bottom Line, on the other hand, includes the broad interests of society directly
(Elkington, 1999). It is based on the idea that firms should measure performance from the
perspective of economic, environmental, and social value added. It is strong in its ability to raise
the awareness of the firm’s broader performance in the eyes of its managers, and helps to
increase the accountability of firms. Along similar lines, Porter and Kramer (2011) recently
argued that organizations should adopt a “shared value” approach that encourages the generation
of profits that also create social benefits. The Triple Bottom Line and Porter and Kramer’s
arguments are part of a rich stream of discussions in the management literature by business and
society scholars under the label of corporate social responsibility (CSR). For these scholars,
business has to think about not just economic value but the ways in which it creates value in
social, environmental and moral terms. CSR has become a vehicle for a wide array of scholars,
critics and activists to criticize what they perceive as excessive self-concern by business elites
and to encourage firms to bring more attention and resources to address issues (i.e. create
“value”) across a range of topics such as the natural environment, sexual harassment, worker jobsecurity, outsourcing of jobs, education, regulation, corporate governance, and the like.
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Perhaps because of its moral foundation, stakeholder theory is often used to support CSR
propositions (Phillips & Freeman, 2008; Phillips, Freeman & Wicks, 2003). However,
stakeholder theory was not developed to advocate for societal interests nor was it about building
value within entire economies - except to the extent that as firms create more value for
themselves and their stakeholders they are, in essence, advancing the interests of society
(Freeman, 1984; Walsh, 2005). Phillips and Freeman (2008), noted experts on the topic, “claim
that stakeholder theory does not apply to entire economies (103).” According to Phillips (and
reaffirmed in Phillips & Freeman, 2008), “ ‘Stakeholder’ is not synonymous with ‘citizen’ or
‘moral agent’ as some wish to interpret it. Rather, a particular and much closer relationship
between an organization and a constituency group is required for stakeholder status. The theory
is delimited and non-stakeholder should remain a meaningful category (491).”
It is precisely the way in which the TBL and CSR try to incorporate concerns for factors
that extend beyond profits that differentiates them from a stakeholder approach. First, both
approaches distinguish “economic” from “social” and “environmental” categories, reinforcing
the idea that these are extra responsibilities for a traditional business. Such a conceptualization
has been criticized for reinforcing the separation thesis – the notion that business and ethics (or
society or the environment) are categorically and conceptually separate spheres of activity (see
Freeman, 1994; Wicks, 1996). The language and conceptual tools used by TBL and CSR
advocates makes the separation thesis an inevitable problem and feeds into the criticism of
shareholder advocates like Friedman that “social responsibilities” are not only optional, but that
they cut against the moral duties of managers.
Second, the categories added for consideration (i.e., society and environment) are not
clearly or directly tied to value creation for stakeholders and the utility they seek in the firm.
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External (rather than internal) firm forces draw attention to these factors. While stakeholders
through their cooperation in firms will tend to want to improve society and not harm the
environment, it isn’t clear the extent to which they will do so in their capacity as stakeholders.
Thus, TBL and CSR differ from the perspective offered in this paper in that our factors are not
shaped by society (e.g. public policy analysts) or environmental activists, but by what
stakeholders seek as utility through their interactions with the firm. To that extent, one criticism
of our stakeholder-based perspective may be that it lacks concern for society, the environment
and minority interests, although stakeholders may bring these concerns with them as they judge
the value of their affiliation with a firm. Firms that ignore the concerns of their stakeholders with
regard to societal dimensions risk reducing the utility those stakeholders perceive they are
getting from the firm. Rather than a weakness, this is simply a practical manifestation of the
stakeholder approach as we have applied it. It is essential to have social and environmental
concerns raised by other groups (e.g. governments, non-profits) to either encourage or require
firms to improve their performance in areas that are of interest to society as a whole.
Finally, it is not clear how the various factors in either the CSR approach or the Triple
Bottom Line relate to each other and thus provide direction for managers beyond the hope that
concern with non-economic factors may enhance the bottom line. In contrast, our model
highlights the inter-connection of factors, how each relates to stakeholder utility, and why all are
important to firm success.
MEASURING THE VALUE CREATED THROUGH A FIRM’S ACTIVITIES
An ongoing theme of this paper is that stakeholders receive value that extends beyond
economic benefits. Consequently, measures of the utility created for stakeholders should
consider both economic and other benefits stakeholders seek. Both practitioner and academic
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researcher aspects of measuring utility are relevant to this discussion. Our discussion of the
measurement implications for academic research is positivist in the sense that we are assuming a
process based on technical analysis in which researchers use large samples of data and statistical
methods to explain observable phenomena (Scherer & Patzer, 2011). Thus, the measures
described in that section will be fairly objective in nature but not as rich as what might be
obtained through personal involvement.
On the other hand, we acknowledge that researchers may also become involved in case
research in which they communicate directly with the focal actors to ascertain what they value
and how the firm has influenced their well being. Scherer and Patzer (2011) refer to this
approach as post-positivist, and explain that it is necessary when normative issues need to be
addressed. The post-positivist or interpretive approach allows the researcher to determine
whether observations are more a function of unchangeable laws or volatile situations that are
subject to change. Participating with the focal actors in the information collection process allows
an observer to gain a clearer picture of their interests, values, and the way they interpret the
world (Habermas, 1990). The practitioner approach, discussed first, is almost entirely postpositivist. Consequently, it allows for collection of rich information that is useful in
understanding what the firm can do to serve its stakeholders and thus create more value.
Practitioner Measures of Value Creation Through the Construct of Happiness
There are a variety of ways one might specify and operationalize our 4-factor model (and
the broader notion of stakeholder utility). The essential ingredients include 1) recognition that the
purpose of a firm, and thus its performance, is based on the amount of value the firm provides to
its stakeholders, 2) inclusion of both economic and non-economic factors that provide utility to
stakeholders, 3) inclusion of measures for all of a firm’s primary stakeholders, 4) recognition that
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different stakeholders are likely to value different things (i.e., their utility functions are different)
and 5) measures should have the capacity to recognize a level of utility to stakeholders that
exceeds mere satisfaction with the firm.
The fifth requirement is essential because reciprocity and generalized exchange, which
provide a foundation for the creation of additional value, require more than just a base level of
stakeholder satisfaction (Bosse, et al., 2009; Harrison, et al., 2010). For example, a stakeholder
that is merely satisfied with their affiliation with a firm or with the level of distributional
(including economic), procedural, or interactional fairness may not have an incentive to cease
relations with the firm but likewise is not particularly motivated to give additional effort, exhibit
a high level of loyalty, engage in more value creating activities with, or provide more potentially
valuable information to the firm. To tap into this additional value creating behavior the firm
needs to provide a level of utility that is above the base level. We believe that one way to get at
this higher level of utility is through the construct of happiness. That is, a stakeholder is not
merely satisfied, but is happy (or potentially very happy) about the amount of utility received
from one of more aspects of engaging with the firm. Happiness as a way of understanding utility
received and thus the value provided to stakeholders builds from the ideas of Mill (1863) and
connects to more recent writings (i.e., Gilbert, 2005; Haidt, 2006; Sidgwick, 1981; Shaw, 1999).
Haidt’s (2006) work, in particular, is interesting in light of the utility-creating notions of
organizational justice we have examined herein, as he advocates for respect, empathy, and a
balance between internal and external factors as the keys to happiness. Our work runs in parallel
with Haidt’s ideas on happiness in that external factors can be interpreted in terms of the tangible
utility gained from goods and services and internal factors that come from the perceived utility
that arises from just and fair treatment, from social capital, and from the intangible benefits of
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esteem and satisfaction associated with affiliating with an organization that exhibits behavior that
is considered virtuous.
As Judge and Kammeyer-Mueller (2011) point out, most of the organizational research
on happiness has been conducted in the context of work. However, happiness research is
increasing in both volume and breadth (Blanchflower & Oswald, 2011; Judge & KammeyerMueller, 2011), and from a stakeholder perspective happiness is just as important to a supplier or
customer as it is to an employee. We will define happiness in terms of the way stakeholders feel
about the intangible and tangible utility they receive through their association and interactions
with the firm. The idea of going directly to stakeholders to measure happiness is consistent with
Gilbert’s (2005) observation that experience is only observable to the people who have it. As
mentioned previously, it is a post-positivist or interpretative approach in which the investigator is
involved directly with the subject (Scherer & Patzer, 2011). We are making this final connection
because we believe it is more practical to measure stakeholder happiness than it is to try to
measure the actual utility received, especially since each stakeholder has a different utility
function, even within groups such as employees, customers or suppliers.
Does heterogeneity within stakeholder groups make any attempt to measure happiness
(and thus utility) meaningless? We believe it does not for two reasons. First, it is nearly
impossible for a firm to make all of its stakeholders happy all of the time. Second, for reasons
already elaborated upon in this manuscript, firms that have the potential to increase the amount
of value they create make most of their stakeholders happy within each of their groups of
legitimate stakeholders. Thus, if a high proportion of stakeholders within a group are unhappy it
is a good indication that the firm has a problem in that area. According to the theory presented
herein, such a problem can hinder creation of incremental value within the system. We should
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also mention one of the risks of collecting this sort of information is that the process can raise the
expectations of stakeholders and thus make it more likely that the firm will disappoint them.
Happiness, which psychologists often refer to as subjective well-being (Diener, Lucas &
Oishi, 2002; Kahneman & Krueger, 2006), can be measured in a number of ways. Perhaps the
most common is self-report questionnaires (Pavot & Diener, 1993). Because of potential
problems associated with self-report measures such as situational priming and cognitive biases,
researchers have also used a technique called Experience Sampling Method that has participants
stop what they are doing and make notes on their experiences (Stone, Shiffman & DeVries,
1999). Other techniques include informant reports from people who are close to the respondent
(Sandvik, et al. 1993), coding of observational data (Frey & Stutzer, 2002) and memory recall of
positive versus negative events (Siedlitz, Wyer & Diener, 1997). Information about stakeholder
happiness may also be obtained from consultants and outside sources, such as rating agencies or
reviews found in periodicals (i.e., Fortune’s “100 Best Companies to Work For”).
If a relationship of trust has been established stakeholders are more likely to be honest
about how happy they are, especially if distributional justice has been exhibited in the past and a
stakeholder therefore believes that any additional value created in the firm as a result of the
information they share is likely to improve their own situation. Overall happiness with the utility
a stakeholder receives from a firm is important and is likely to influence stakeholder behavior;
however, it may not be particularly helpful in terms of diagnosing problems or finding new ways
to create value for stakeholders. Consequently, happiness should be measured for multiple
dimensions for each primary stakeholder. Table 2 (left column) contains examples of the types of
dimensions that might be measured. The list is not intended to be definitive, especially since
stakeholders themselves determine their own utility functions. It is, however, a good starting
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point for those things firms might consider as they examine the value they are providing to their
stakeholders.
(Insert Table 2 about here)
Measures for Academic Research
Academic researchers may use a case-based method to gather rich information about the
happiness of firm stakeholders. A case method is superior to large sample statistical studies
based on objective measures if the goal is to sort out normative issues or to distinguish between
constant influences and situational factors that are subject to change (Scherer & Patzer, 2011).
However, frequently it is difficult to make generalizations based on case research that apply to a
broader group of companies. For these situations, we believe that effective (albeit not perfect)
measures can be selected from archival sources or obtained through primary sources such as
surveys.
Consistent with stakeholder theory, academic measures of organizational performance
should be measured from the perspective of multiple stakeholders so as to capture as much value
as possible. For example, in order to gain a more complete picture of the value created or
destroyed in a large scale organizational change such as moving a headquarters or engaging in an
acquisition, studies of these sorts of phenomena should include measures from the perspective of
several stakeholder groups such as customers, employees, shareholders, suppliers and local
communities, rather than focusing on just one. These measures should also address the idea that
more value is created when the firm provides a level of utility to a stakeholder that goes above
the norm (happiness). Consequently, the best measures allow firms to be compared to other firms
in general or to firms in their industries. Multiple sources of information about a particular
stakeholder, where available, are better than relying on one source of information. This provides
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triangulation. Finally, proxies should be allowed. A researcher may not be able to ask a
stakeholder directly how happy they are with a firm, but might be able to determine what the
firm is doing for the stakeholder that can realistically make that stakeholder happy. For instance,
although it is especially difficult to assess supplier happiness, there is one thing a firm can do
that arguably makes a difference to the supplier—pay bills quickly. Consequently, a measure like
cost of goods sold divided by accounts payable might serve as one possible proxy for the
happiness of suppliers.
The right column of Table 2 contains examples of a variety of possible measures of (and
proxies for) value created for stakeholders. It is not intended to be exhaustive but rather
representative of what is available or can be obtained through primary research. Several KLD
variables are included in the table. 2 Although the KLD data are oriented towards social
responsibility (Sharman, 1996), a lot of it applies also to how a firm treats its stakeholders (see
Berman, et al., 1999; Hillman & Keim, 2001). Frequently researchers combine the scores from
five KLD areas to form a composite measure of performance: community, employees, diversity,
the environment, and products. These measures consolidate values from over 50 KLD variables.
We recommend instead that researchers examine each of the individual variables closely and
include only those that best fit their theory (Chatterji & Levine, 2006) rather than relying on the
five-factor measure simply because is has been used previously. Table 2 includes a number of
KLD shareholder variables that have been left out of most of the empirical research using KLD
data. Also included in the table are suggestions for proxies to measure value created for
suppliers. We are not aware of any studies in the stakeholder literature that account for this
important stakeholder.
2

In 2010 MSCI acquired RiskMetrics, who had previously acquired KLD (Kinder, Lydenberg & Domini) Research
and Analytics. The KLD data are now called the ESG (environmental, social and governance) indexes, but to avoid
confusion we are keeping the traditional name most often found in the research literature.
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DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
This paper argues that the utility stakeholders seek is complex and pertains to more than
just economic value. Firms that provide more utility to their stakeholders are better able to retain
their participation and support. Furthermore, stakeholders depend on both the firm and its other
stakeholders to satisfy their own interests. We develop a four-factor perspective on the utility
stakeholders receive from a firm as a more complete construct of firm performance than popular
financial performance measures. The stakeholder-based perspective of performance can help
managers determine where their attention is needed in order facilitate the creation of more value.
Collecting non-financial information on firm performance has also been found to enhance
communication, learning and coordination within firms (Dossi & Patelli, 2010).
Similarly, a stakeholder-based perspective on performance may lead researchers to
consider the influence of organizational activities and phenomena on a much wider range of
stakeholders. Indeed, our argument begins as an affirmation of Freeman’s (1984) original claim
that attending to stakeholders and their interests is a critical starting point for managers and
provides a foundation that drives their ongoing success. At present, there are very few studies
that examine the influence of firm activities on a broad group of stakeholders (a notable
exception is Waddock and Graves, 2006). For major advances to be made in the empirical
stakeholder literature, stakeholder-based performance should be the dependent rather than the
independent variable. We would also argue for further conceptual and empirical work examining
our model (and rival perspectives on value for stakeholders).
One issue for future research relates to the question of cooperation and conflict regarding
stakeholders (and their interests). The argument made in this paper is that stakeholder theory
suggests that cooperation, rather than conflict, should be the primary managerial mindset (e.g.
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Freeman, 1994; Freeman, Harrison & Wicks, 2007). Stakeholders do not always cooperate, and
their interests can conflict, particularly when one operates from a theoretical lens that highlights
such potential conflict (e.g. agency theory). Thus, future work might explore an array of
questions about cooperation and conflict among stakeholder interests raised by a focus on value
creation. For example, there is need to further investigate the creation of processes and valid
norms among stakeholders (e.g. Habermas, 1990) as a means of resolving (potential) conflicts in
ways that are both normatively sound and instrumentally viable (e.g. Jones and Wicks, 1999).
Similarly, there are potential conflicts between the utility that stakeholders and firms seek versus
what society may value; research is needed both to document consistent kinds of gaps between
the two potential means to close the gap (e.g. regulation, incentives, education, public policy).
Future research might also explore whether the resources an organization expends in creating
utility for its stakeholders is more than compensated for by the additional value created within
the firm’s system.
From a practical perspective, much of management research has focused on financial
performance as the exclusive criterion of interest; thus, it tends to provide prescriptions that
optimize financial performance rather than the total value created. For example, the merger and
acquisitions literature has been dominated by research focusing on shareholder returns.
Consequently, researchers and practitioners who use this literature to derive firm
recommendations are biased in terms of maximizing the financial success of an acquisition rather
than creating value in broad stakeholder terms. We understand by now that there are human costs
associated with mergers and acquisitions, but what strategies can a firm making an acquisition
use to reduce those costs and possibly even enhance value created for employees, communities,
suppliers and so forth. If the total value is considered, how are management decisions likely to
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change? The same might be said for restructurings, joint ventures, new product development,
various types of training programs, management succession, or plant location decisions. This
shift in perspective opens up the ability to create more value (and a broader array of value) for
stakeholders. Also, the perspective may lead managers to utilize moral imagination (Werhane,
1999), seek creative solutions, and make choices that might otherwise seem counter-intuitive
from a shareholder-dominated approach.
Some scholars argue that there is a risk that too many performance measures will reduce
the influence of any one measure in terms of what managers focus on (Chatterji & Levine, 2006;
Jensen, 2001). However, unlike Jensen’s single performance objective, our perspective is about
joint value maximization and the processes through which it is achieved (Zajac & Olsen, 1993).
As managers focus on creating utility for their stakeholders, across both tangible and intangible
factors, more value is created. Neglect of any one stakeholder could set off a downward spiral in
the system as the firm’s other stakeholders respond to what they observe. Consequently, our
position is that the real risk, from a managerial position, is that managers will become focused on
too few objectives representing too few stakeholder interests, rather than too many.
We would like to say in closing that it is not our intention to suggest that the four factors
we have identified are the only important factors. We selected factors that are highly relevant to
stakeholder theory (because our stated purpose was to provide a stakeholder-based model). Our
factors are also closely associated with the amount of value a firm creates and is able to create in
the future. They are broad based and include both economic and noneconomic factors, consistent
with our argument that both types of factors are important to the amount of utility stakeholders
receive from interactions with a firm. However, other factors may be found to be as or more
important as this stream of research continues.
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Similarly, we use the happiness construct as an example of the way some of our ideas
might be specified in research. Of course, happiness was also a part of some of the original
writings on value and utility, and is regaining popularity as a variable of interest. One evidence
of this fact is that the National People’s Congress in China recently declared that increasing
happiness is more important than increasing GDP (Economist, 2011). Nonetheless, it would be a
mistake to focus exclusively on stakeholder happiness in future research. One of the major
themes of this paper is that multiple measures of firm performance are superior to just one (i.e.,
financial returns). A singular emphasis on happiness would be subject to the same criticisms.
Value, what it means, how it is created and how we measure it cuts to the core of our
understanding of organizations. It also speaks to the fundamentals of what it means to live well,
something that has been a perennial concern of ethicists (e.g. Solomon, 1992). This work
highlights the need for actually doing the hard work of developing new measures of firm
performance based on the value a firm creates for its stakeholders, and going out and gathering
data – both for academics and for firms. From a managerial perspective, collecting this data can
be a powerful signal to stakeholders about their commitment to them, can lead to innovation and
enhanced efficiency because of the new information that is obtained during the process, and may
provide more than mere intuition to guide the underlying logic of how a firm creates outstanding
performance. Creating processes for engaging stakeholders and understanding value creation
from their perspective is critical to firm success and the ability to remain a vibrant business in the
future.
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TABLE 1
A Sampling of Relevant Notions of “Value”
Value in Exchange: the idea that value is based on how much a given item is within in a
marketplace exchange (e.g. Adam Smith; Neoclassical Economics). Value here is negotiated and
inter-subjective.
Value of Use: value here is based on a subjective evaluation of how much an item is worth to a
particular individual; may not be visible to others and may vary from zero to nearly infinite
value.
Value of Labor: value is based on how much labor was required to create an item (e.g. David
Ricardo; Karl Marx; classical economics). Value here is determined independent of individual
preferences and set by a quality inherent to the object (i.e. by labor).
Value of Production: value is based on the total costs involved to produce an item (e.g. like
Value of Labor, but adding in other related costs to produce an item). As with Value of Labor,
value is set independent of individual preferences.
Intrinsic v. Extrinsic Value: one way to think about value is whether it is intrinsic, or an inherent
feature, of an item – or whether it is simply a vehicle or means to some other good (i.e.
extrinsic). Most goods in the marketplace are “extrinsic”. A sandwich is good for satisfying my
hunger; money helps me feel important or secure – both are “extrinsic” goods. However, some
things are good in and of themselves. Kant calls a good will an inherent good; virtues also would
qualify as inherent goods.
Subjective v. Objective Value: related to the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic good is
the contrast between subjective and objective notions of value. While there are numerous ways
of defining both terms, subjective typically refers to the assessment of an individual and what
they happen to like, while objective typically refers to a norm that operates across individuals or
at a higher level of analysis (e.g. a universal moral norm; a social value; a human right).
Sources: Hausman & McPherson, 2006; Sen, 1987.
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TABLE 2
Examples of Performance Measures from Multiple Stakeholder Perspectives
Employees

Potential Categories for Measuring Happiness/Well-being
• Various components of employment contract (i.e., pay, benefits,
perquisites)
• Perceived fairness of decision making processes
• Perceived treatment (i.e., respect, inclusiveness)
• Perceived authenticity (i.e., what firm says, it does)
• Consistency between stated vs. realized firm values (i.e., honesty)
• Promotion policies/upward mobility
• Firm’s environmental performance
• Firm’s position/performance on other societal issues
• Also, objective measures such as turnover, legal actions

Customers

• Product/service features
• Perceived treatment during transactions (i.e., respect, fairness)
• Perceived authenticity (i.e., what firm says, it does)
• Firm’s environmental performance
• Firm’s position/performance on other societal issues
• Also, objective measures such as repeat business, legal actions

Suppliers

• Perceived treatment during transactions (i.e., respect, fairness)
• Firm’s environmental performance
• Firm’s position/performance on other societal issues
• Nature of payments (i.e., size, speed)
• Also, objective measures such as longevity, availability of supplies
• Financial returns
• Perceived riskiness of investment
• Governance structure and policies
• Disclosure of pertinent information/transparency
• Firm’s environmental performance
• Firm’s position/performance on other societal issues
• Also, objective data on returns and risk
• Perceived impact on community/environment (per community
leaders or general perceptions)
• Perception of integrity of firm
• Also, objective data on number of positive/negative encounters,
community service, charitable and infrastructure contributions

Shareholders

Community
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Potential Proxies for Researchers
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Compensation and benefits
Workplace benefits (i.e., fitness center, child care)
Legal actions or, if unionized, grievances
Productivity measures
Inclusion on list of best companies to work for
Internal promotions to top management
Turnover
KLD Health and Safety Concern or Strength
KLD Workforce Reductions
KLD Pension/Benefits Concern or Strength
KLD Cash Profit Sharing
Growth in sales
Consumer reports on products/services
Reputation rankings
KLD Product Safety Concern
KLD Marketing or Contracting Controversy
KLD Quality Ranking of Products
KLD R&D/Innovation Ranking
Days payable (from accounting statements)
Longevity of supplier relationships (available in 10-K for some firms)
Legal actions

•
•
•
•
•
•

Shareholder returns
Price-to-earnings ratio (P/E)
Risk associated with returns (i.e., variance and beta)
Number of shareholder proposals
Compensation levels of top managers (KLD Compensation High or Low)
KLD Ownership Concern

•
•
•
•
•

Tax breaks or other advantages provided to the firm
New local regulations that affect firm
Legal actions
KLD Tax Disputes or Investment Controversies
KLD Negative Economic Impact

• KLD Generous Giving
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